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Abstract
Neural network classifiers are vulnerable to data poisoning
attacks, as attackers can degrade or even manipulate their
predictions thorough poisoning only a few training samples.
However, the robustness of heuristic defenses is hard to mea-
sure. Random selection based defenses can achieve certified
robustness by averaging the classifiers’ predictions on the
sub-datasets sampled from the training set. This paper pro-
poses a framework of random selection based certified de-
fenses against data poisoning attacks. Specifically, we prove
that the random selection schemes that satisfy certain con-
ditions are robust against data poisoning attacks. We also de-
rive the analytical form of the certified radius for the qualified
random selection schemes. The certified radius of bagging de-
rived by our framework is tighter than the previous work. Our
framework allows users to improve robustness by leverag-
ing prior knowledge about the training set and the poisoning
model. Given higher level of prior knowledge, we can achieve
higher certified accuracy both theoretically and practically.
According to the experiments on three benchmark datasets:
MNIST 1/7, MNIST, and CIFAR-10, our method outperforms
the state-of-the-art.
Introduction
Neural network classifiers are vulnerable to designed train-
ing samples added in the training set or the testing data (Big-
gio, Nelson, and Laskov 2012; Szegedy et al. 2014). Ma-
nipulating 1% of the dataset can cause the target image to
be misclassified at a 90% success rate (Huang et al. 2020).
Inserting less than 5% poisoned training samples can make
the classifier’s feature selection almost randomly (Xiao et al.
2015). There exists many kinds of data poisoning attacks
(Chen et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2018; Turner, Tsipras, and
Madry 2018; Zhao et al. 2020; Turner, Tsipras, and Madry
2019; Ji, Zhang, and Wang 2017; Yao et al. 2019b; Zhang
et al. 2020; Yao et al. 2019a). Therefore, it is urgent to de-
velop defenses against data poisoning attacks. Many heuris-
tic defenses have been proposed (Wang et al. 2019; Chen
et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2019; Gao et al. 2019; Tran, Li, and
Madry 2018; Liu et al. 2019; Qiao, Yang, and Li 2019; Stein-
hardt, Koh, and Liang 2017) against data poisoning attacks,
but the security level of those defenses is hard to measure. To
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achieve certified robustness, various certified defenses have
been proposed, including randomized smoothing based de-
fenses (Wang et al. 2020; Rosenfeld et al. 2020; Jia, Cao,
and Gong 2020), loss based defenses (Steinhardt, Koh, and
Liang 2017) and differential privacy based defenses (Ma,
Zhu, and Hsu 2019). Compared with other defenses, ran-
domized smoothing has no limitation on the training algo-
rithms and is able to certify robustness for each testing data.
To our knowledge, previous works of randomized smooth-
ing defenses only considered one specific smooth scheme.
There is a lack of a framework of randomized smoothing
based defenses in defending data poisoning attacks.
In this paper, we propose a framework of random selec-
tion based defenses against data poisoning attacks, which is
a subset of randomized smoothing. Our framework shows
that any random selection scheme satisfying certain condi-
tions is robust to data poisoning attacks. Through our frame-
work, we can derive the certified radius for all qualified ran-
dom selection schemes, including bagging. We also propose
a method to enhance robustness by leveraging 2 types of
prior knowledge: the prior knowledge about the training set
and the poisoning model. We divide the poisoning model
into 6 cases and the prior knowledge about the training set
into 3 cases. We can improve the derived certified radius
theoretically when the poisoning model is weak. When we
have high level of prior knowledge about the training set, we
propose 2-phase classification to enhance robustness empir-
ically. In addition, our training algorithms use a weight bal-
ance method to solve the problem of low certified accuracy
when the size of the selection is small. Our contributions are
as follow:
• We propose a framework of random selection based de-
fenses against data poisoning attacks. The certified radius
derived by our framework is tighter than previous works.
• We propose a method to enhance robustness by leveraging
prior knowledge about the training set and the poisoning
model, which makes our framework more practical in real
applications.
• We evaluate 3 random selection based defenses across
three classification tasks: MNIST 1/7, MNIST and
CIFAR-10. Our certified accuracy outperforms previous
works.
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Related Works
Previous works have investigated in using randomized
smoothing to defend data poisoning attacks. The main chal-
lenges in applying randomized smoothing are choosing an
appropriate smooth scheme and deriving its certified radius.
Rosenfeld et al. (Rosenfeld et al. 2019) proposed the ran-
dom flip scheme to defend label flipping attacks, but Rosen-
feld has not considered the attacks of modifying training
data. Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2020) proposed the smooth
scheme of adding noise into each training sample to defend
backdoor attacks, but the certified radius derived by Wang
is loose. Jia et al. (Jia, Cao, and Gong 2020) proposed the
bagging smooth scheme, which is a variant of random selec-
tion schemes. However, Jia has not considered other random
selection schemes in defending data poisoning attacks. We
also find that the certified radius derived by Jia still has room
for improvement. The randomized smoothing defenses also
have their intrinsic limitation. Weber and Kumar et al. (We-
ber et al. 2020; Kumar et al. 2020) have proved the no-go
theorem for randomized smoothing independently: without
more information than label statistics under random input
perturbations, the largest `p certified radius decreases as
O(d1/p−1/2)) with dimension d for p > 2. This theorem
proves the upper bound for the robustness of randomized
smoothing methods. To bypass this limitation, leveraging
prior knowledge is necessary. Jia et al. (Jia, Cao, and Gong
2020) propose to use transfer learning to improve robust-
ness. However, the improvement of transfer learning meth-
ods is defending on the pre-train models. In many cases, a
satisfactory pre-train model is not available. Instead of pre-
train models, we propose to use prior knowledge about the
poisoning model and the training set to improve robustness.
The prior knowledge about the training set is the clean train-
ing samples known in advance, which is more practical than
pre-train models.
Preliminaries
Neural Network
A neural network h(x|Dn) : Rd → Y is a mapping
from the input feature space to the output space. We re-
fer to the input space as Rd and the output space as
Y def= {y : y = 0, 1, . . . , k}. The confidence for each class is
hc(x) : Rd → [0, 1] (c = 1, 2, . . . , k). We rank each class by
its confidence in decreasing order c1(x), c2(x), . . . , ck(x).
We denote the confidence of ci(x) as pi(x)
def
= hci(x).
Classifier
We refer toDn
def
=
{
(xi, yi)
n
i=1 : xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ Y}k
}
as the
training set 1. h(x|Dn) is the classifier trained on the dataset
Dn. In this paper, we mainly focus on the relation between
the predictions and the training set. We express h(x|Dn) as
fx(Dn), as a function of Dn when x is fixed. fx(Dn) can
be any deterministic or random function.
1We only consider the training sample of unique label
Poisoning model
Poisoning model is prior knowledge about the attacker’s ca-
pability. We denote the poisoning model as Pρ : Dn →
{D′m} that maps a dataset to a set of all possible poisoned
datasets. ρ is the intensity of the poisoning attacks. In this
paper, we consider 6 cases of the poisoning model:
1. (P 1ρ ) Insert at most ρ arbitrary samples into Dn.
2. (P 2ρ ) Delete at most ρ arbitrary samples in Dn.
3. (P 3ρ ) Modify at most ρ arbitrary samples in Dn.
4. (P 4ρ ) Insert and/or modify at most ρ arbitrary samples in
Dn.
5. (P 5ρ ) Delete and/or modify at most ρ arbitrary samples in
Dn.
6. (P 6ρ ) Insert, delete and/or modify at most ρ arbitrary sam-
ples in Dn.
We do not consider the case of Insertion and deletion be-
cause the effect of deleting k training sample and inserting
k new sample simultaneously is equivalent to modifying k
training sample. In the later of this paper, we will show how
to leverage the information about the poisoning model to im-
prove robustness.
Random selection scheme
A random selection scheme is a scheme of selecting
a subset from the dataset µ : Dn → Dsub. Here
Dsub = {(xi, yi)i∈S : S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}}. Random selec-
tion schemes will not modify any sample in Dn.
Certified radius
Given a classifier fx() and the poisoning model Pρ, the cer-
tified radius of fx() at x under Pρ is the maximum value of
ρ that satisfies:
fx(D
′
m) = fx(Dn), ∀D′m ∈ Pρ(Dn)
Certified radius means the maximum attack intensity that the
defense can defend.
Proposed Framework
In this paper, our goal is to solve the following 2 problems:
1. Which random selection schemes are robust to the poi-
soning model?
2. How to compute the certified radius of the random selec-
tion schemes that are robust to the poisoning model?
In this section, we solve the above 2 problems by Theorem
1. To show the applicability of Theorem 1, we propose 3
commonly used variants of random selection schemes. All
3 schemes satisfy the conditions proposed in theorem 1. Fi-
nally we propose 2 training algorithms for different cases
of prior knowledge about the training set to apply random
selection schemes into practice.
To achieve certified robustness against the attack where
training samples are arbitrarily changed, we first assume that
the prediction will change if the training set contains greater
Figure 1: A sketch map of random selection based defenses. We sample T sub-datasets
{
Disub
}T
i=1
= µ(Dp) from the poisoned
part Dp of the training set. µ is the random selection scheme. We combine
{
Disub
}T
i=1
with the clean part Dc of the training
set to generate the training set for the base classifiers Dsub ∪Dc. We train T base classifiers on T datasets
{
Disub ∪Dc
}T
i=1
.
The smooth classifier g is the aggregation of those T base classifiers by majority rule.
than or equal to one poisoned training sample. The assump-
tion is conservative but reasonable because there is no limi-
tation on the neural networks. For a simple model like logis-
tic regression, changing only one training sample can largely
affect its predictions. We propose random selection methods
to prevent predictions from being affected by limited num-
ber of poisoned training samples greatly. The main idea of
random selection is to sample a subset of the training set and
learns the base classifiers on the subset, which is showed in
Figure 1. Theorem 1 gives the theoretical guarantee for the
robustness of random selection schemes. The proof of theo-
rem 1 is in the appendix due to space limitation.
Theorem 1. Given any classifier fx(), the smooth clas-
sifier of the random selection scheme µ is gx(·) =
EDns∼µns (Dn)fx(·). Let gx predicts top-2 classes c1, c2
with the confidence p1, p2 (p1 > p2) respectively. Let
Pρ : Dn → D′m as the poisoning model. Let Ω = Dn ∩D′m
be the set of unmodified samples. If the random selection
scheme µ satisfies
∀D′m ∈ Pρ(Dn), ∃ constants pi1, pi2 (1)
s.t. ∀Dsub ∈ Ω (2)
pi2Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ≥ Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (3)
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) ≥ pi1Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) (4)
and if p1, p2 satisfy:
pi1p1 − pi1
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ≥
pi2p2 +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)
(5)
Then:
gx(D
′
m) = c1 (6)
According to Theorem 1, if we can find pi1, pi2 for the
random selection scheme µ, µ is robust to data poisoning at-
tacks. Given the poisoning model Pρ, we can compute the
tight certified radius according to the equation 5. To show
the applicability of Theorem 1, we give 3 typical random
selection schemes and prove that they all satisfy the condi-
tions.
Certified robustness of 3 random selection schemes
We introduce 3 typical random selection schemes: bagging
without replacement, bagging with replacement and bino-
mial selection. Those 3 schemes all have the property pi1 =
pi2, so the inequality 5 can be simplified to be p1−p2 ≥ δ(ρ)
where δ(ρ) is∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) +
1
pi1
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)
δ(ρ) is the minimum value of p1 − p2 for x to be robust
against poisoning ρ training samples. δ(ρ) increases in pro-
portion to ρ. δ(ρ) = 0 when ρ = 0. We will give analytical
forms of δ(ρ) for 3 schemes.
1. (Bagging without replacement). Given Dn and let ns be
the size of Dsub, bagging without replacement µ is:
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = 1/
(
n
ns
)
(7)
2. (Bagging with replacement). Given Dn and ns, bagging
with replacement µ is.
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = (
1
n
)ns (8)
3. (Binomial selection). For each sample (xi, yi)ni=1 ∈ Dn,
the probability of (xi, yi) being selected is p = ns/n.
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = p
ns(1− p)n−ns (9)
δ(ρ) of 3 random selection schemes against the poisoning
model P 6ρ are as follow:
Corollary 1. (Certified robustness of bagging without
replacement). pi1, pi2 of bagging without replacement is
pi1 = pi2 =
(
m
ns
)
/
(
n
ns
)
(10)
δ(ρ) of bagging without replacement is
max
m∈[n−ρ,n+ρ]
1−
(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
n
ns
)
+
(
n
ns
)
/
(
m
ns
)
−
(
n
ns
)(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
m
ns
)2
Corollary 2. (Certified robustness of bagging with replace-
ment). pi1, pi2 of bagging with replacement is
pi1 = pi2 = (
n
m
)ns (11)
δ(ρ) of bagging without replacement is
max
m∈[n−ρ,n+ρ]
1 +
(m
n
)ns − 2(max(m,n)− rho
n
)ns
Corollary 3. (Certified robustness of binomial selection).
pi1, pi2 of binomial selection is
pi1 = pi2 = (1− p)m−n (12)
δ(ρ) of binomial selection is
max
m∈[n−ρ,n+ρ]
1 + (1− p)n−m
− 2(1− p)min(n−m,0)+ρ (p = ns/n)
Comparison with previous works To our knowledge,
only bagging with replacement (Jia, Cao, and Gong 2020)
and differentially-private learners (Ma, Zhu, and Hsu 2019)
achieve certified robustness against general data poisoning
attacks. The assumption of differentially-private learners is
different from us, so it is hard to compare with it theoreti-
cally. Therefore, we only compare our theory with (Jia, Cao,
and Gong 2020). Compared with (Jia, Cao, and Gong 2020),
δ derived by Jia contains 2 additional non-negative terms
p1 − (bp1 · nkc/nk) and p2 − (dp2 · nke/nk). In almost all
cases, those 2 terms are greater than 0. Therefore, the certi-
fied robustness derived by us is tighter than Jia.
Prior knowledge about poisoning model P If we know
the poisoning model P in advance, we can add additional
restriction on the variable m and δ(ρ) to derive lower δ(ρ).
Here we formulate 6 cases of poisoning model into the form
that can be used into our theorem 1.
1. (P1)
m ∈ [n, n+ ρ] ,
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = 0
2. (P2)
m ∈ [n− ρ, n] ,
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = 1
3. (P3) m = n
4. (P4) m ∈ [n, n+ ρ]
5. (P5) m ∈ [n− ρ, n]
6. (P6) m ∈ [n− ρ, n+ ρ]
A comparison of 3 random selection schemes
Figure 2: δ(ρ) of 3 random selection schemes as a function
of ρ under the poisoning scheme P6. Left: n = 13007, ns =
10. Right: n = 50000, ns = 1000.
In Figure 2, we show δ(ρ) of 3 random selection schemes
respectively. When n and ns are small, δ(ρ) of binomial se-
lection is the smallest and δ(ρ) of bagging without replace-
ment is the highest. When n and ns are large, δ(ρ) of 3 ran-
dom selection schemes are nearly the same.
Practical Algorithm
In practice, evaluating the precise value of p1, p2 needs unaf-
fordable computation cost. Therefore, we use a Monte-Carlo
method to estimate p1, p2. We follow (Jia et al. 2020) to use
SimuEM for the confidence interval estimation. We estimate
p1, p2 with confidence level of 1−α/2. Then the simultane-
ous confidence level of p1, p2 is higher than 1− α.
p1 = BinoCP(α/2;T, count(c1)) (13)
p2 = min(1− p1,BinoCP(1− α/2;T, count(c2))) (14)
Our certified prediction 1 is as follow:
Training algorithms and prior knowledge about Dn
In reality, users may know the clean part Dc of Dn in ad-
vance. In this case, Dn can divided into 2 parts: the clean
partDc and the potentially poisoned partDp.Dc = ∅means
that all the training samples have the probability of being
poisoned. Treating Dc in the same way as Dp is not ideal.
We regard Dc as prior knowledge and only apply random
selection schemes onDp. However, how to leverageDc effi-
ciently is a problem. We divide prior knowledge into 3 cases
as Figure3.
1. (Case 1).The attacker can poison all the training samples
in Dn. (Dc = ∅)
Algorithm 1 Certified prediction
Input: The input x, the smooth classifier g, the number of
selections Ns, the size of poisoned part Np;
Output: Prediction y and certified radius r(x);
1: Compute fi(x)Ti=1 and counts the number of labels;
2: c1, c2 ← top-2 classes in {fi(x)}Ti=1;
3: count1, count2 ← Count(c1), Count(c2);
4: p1,← BINOCP(α/2, count1, T ),
p2 ← BINOCP(1− α/2, count2, T );
5: Compute r(x) = max ρ that satisfies δ(ρ) ≤ p1 − p2
6: if r(x) not exists then
7: return ABSTAIN,ABSTAIN
8: else
9: return y = c1 and r(x);
10: end if
2. (Case 2).The attacker can operate limited number of train-
ing samples in the poisoned part of the training set. (Dc is
a set of several training samples)
3. (Case 3).The attacker can operate limited number of train-
ing samples of specific classes. (Dc is all the training sam-
ples from the unpoisoned classes)
Figure 3: A toy example of 3 conditions. We assume Dn is
those 40 training samples and the attacker can poison at most
2 samples. Case 1: the attacker modifies 2 arbitrary samples.
Case 2: the attacker poisons 2 samples in the poisoned part
Dp. Case 3: the attacker poisons 2 samples of classes 8, 9.
In this section, we propose 2 training algorithms corre-
sponding to the above 3 cases.
Training algorithm for cases 1,2 We sample T sub-
datasets of size ns from Dn and train T base classifiers on
those T sub-datasets. In practice, we found that the sam-
pled sub-datasets are usually imbalanced. Especially when
ns is small, the problem of imbalance is highly severe. The
base classifiers tend to predict the most frequent class in the
sub-datasets. The most frequent class of each sampled sub-
dataset has a high probability to be different, which causes
T base classifiers tend to make different predictions. There-
fore, imbalance not only decreases the accuracy of base clas-
sifiers, but also lower the robustness of the smooth classi-
fiers. We use the weighted balance method to eliminate the
negative influence brought from the imbalance in Dn. The
training algorithm for cases 1,2 is showed in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 2 The training algorithm for cases 1,2
Input: The potentially poisoned part of the training setDp,
the clean part of the training set Dc, selection size ns,
the number of base classifiers T ;
Output: smooth classifier g;
1: for i in range(T ) do
2: Sample a ns-size sub-dataset from Dp: Dins =
µ(Dp);
3: Sample minibatchs from BALANCE(Disub ∪Dc)
# BALANCE() is a sample balancing method;
4: Train f i on the minibatchs;
5: end for
6: return g = Maj(f1, f2, . . . , fT ) # Majority rule;
Algorithm 3 2-phase weighted training for case 3
Input: The potentially poisoned part of the training setDp,
the clean part of the training set Dc, selection size ns,
the number of base classifiers T ;
Output: smooth classifier g;
1: for i in range(T ) do
2: Sample a ns-size sub-dataset from Dp: Dins =
µ(Dp);
3: Construct training set Disub = D
i
ns ∪Dc;
# All the samples in Dc is of the class c˜
4: D˜isub, GDisub = DETERMINE(D
i
sub,HASH(), G);
5: Sample minibatchs from BALANCE(Disub ∪Dc)
# BALANCE() is a sample balancing method
6: Train f i on the minibatchs;
7: end for
8: Train φ2 on the dataset Dc for the 2nd phase classifica-
tion;
9: return g = φ2(Maj(φ11, φ21, . . . , φt1)) # Majority rule;
Training algorithm for case 3 We refer to the set of
clean classes and the set of potentially poisoned classes as
Cclean, Cpoisoned respectively. Cclean ∪Cpoisoned is the set
of all classes. For convenience, we use a virtual class c˜ to
represent Cclean. The main idea is to use 2-phase classifiers
as the base classifiers for case 3. In the 1st phase, we use
the sub-classifier φ1 to classify x to be which class among
c˜ ∪ Cpoisoned. If φ1(x) = c˜, we use the sub-classifier φ2 to
classify x to be which class in Cclean. The base classifier is
φ2(φ1(·)). For the ith base classifier, the sub-classifier φi1 is
trained on the sub-dataset Disub ∪ Dc, Dsub ∈ Dp. φ2 is
trained on the clean dataset Dc, so φ2 would not be affected
by poisoning attacks. We let all the base classifiers share the
same φ2. If two sub-classifiers φi1, φ
j
1 predict the same class,
the prediction of the base classifiers φi1(φ2) and φ
j
1(φ2) will
Figure 4: Experiments of 3 random selection schemes on MNIST 1/7 (Top row), full MNIST (Middle row) and CIFAR10
(Bottom row). Left: bagging without replacement 1, Middle: bagging with replacement 2 Right: binomial selection 3 (ns: the
size of the random selection, nc: the number of known clean samples).
be the same. Therefore, training T base classifiers is equal
to training T sub-classifiers
{
φi1
}T
i=1
on
{
Disub ∪Dc
}T
i=1
and one φ2. The original #Cclean + #Cpoisoned classifi-
cation task is converted into a 1 + #Cpoisoned classifica-
tion task. The complexity of neural networks φ1 and φ2 can
be much lower than the original base classifiers, which de-
creases computation cost.
Experiment
Experimental Setup
To compare fairly, we conduct experiments on three typi-
cal datasets: MNIST 1/7 (13, 007 training samples), MNIST
(60, 000 training samples) and CIFAR10 (60, 000 training
samples), which are the same as previous works. We use
LeNet for MNIST 1/7, MNIST and use ResNet 18 for CI-
FAR10. We train T = 1000 base classifiers for MNIST, 1/7
MNIST and T = 500 base classifiers for CIFAR-10. For all
base classifiers, we use the weight balance method to train.
We found that when the size of Dsub is small, the I/O cost
of loading Dsub is much higher than computation. When
ns = 10 for MNIST 1/7, the GPU-Util is only 1%. There-
fore, for each sampled sub-dataset Dsub, we apply Weight-
edRandomSampler to expand Dsub to a fixed-size dataset.
We can achieve convergence after training only a few epochs
on the expanded dataset, which vastly accelerates the train-
ing. For conciseness, we use scheme 1, 2, 3 to represent the
bagging without replacement, the bagging with replacement
and the binomial selection respectively.
We evaluate robustness of the defenses by their certified
accuracy. Given ρ, the certified accuracy of ρ is:
CA =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
{
gxi(Dn) = yi and p1 − p2 ≥ δ(ρ)
}
(15)
where p1, p2 is estimated by SimuEM with confidence level
0.999, which is the same as (Jia, Cao, and Gong 2020).
A comparison on 3 random selection schemes (case
1, 2)
Figure 4 shows the performances of 3 random selection
schemes on MNIST 1/7, full MNIST and CIFAR-10. The
certified accuracy of 3 random selection schemes is nearly
the same across all the combinations of ns and nc. How-
ever, for the dataset MNIST 1/7 when ns = 10, nc = 0,
the certified accuracy of scheme 3 decreases to 0% at 868
while scheme1,2 are at 855, 857 respectively. This is be-
cause δ(ρ) of scheme 3 is less than the δ(ρ) of scheme 1,2
when the size of the training set n and the selection size ns
are small, which is showed in Figure 2. Some people may
worry that the variation in the sizes of sub-datasets sampled
by scheme 3 will cause several base classifiers to perform
not well. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the sizes of the
sub-datasets and the average accuracy corresponding to the
size of training set. Among T = 1000 sub-datasets, more
than 994 datasets are of the sizes larger than 3. The accu-
racy of 994 base classifiers is higher than 80%. MNIST 1/7
is a simple classification task, so the classifiers trained with
few samples can achieve high accuracy. On full MNIST and
CIFAR-10, 3 schemes perform almost the same. One rea-
son is showed in Figure 2: when ns + nc is large, δ(ρ) of
3 schemes are nearly the same. Another reason is that when
the classification task is not simple, the improvement in ac-
curacy needs bigger changes of the dataset. Therefore, the
accuracy of 3 schemes is close.
Figure 5: Top: the number of the ns-size sub-datasets sam-
pled by the binomial selection. The number of all sub-
datasets is 13007, which is the size of MNIST 1/7 training
set. Bottom: the average clean accuracy as a function of the
size of the datasets.
A comparison on case 3
We conduct experiments on MNIST to compare the 2-phase
classifiers with the traditional training algorithm used in (Jia,
Cao, and Gong 2020). For a fair comparison, we use the ran-
dom selection scheme 2, which is the same as (Jia, Cao, and
Gong 2020). Let 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 to be the clean classes
and 9 to be the poisoned class. In our 2-phase classifica-
tion, the dataset for training the 2nd-phase sub-classifier φ2
is well balanced. Therefore, we can easily train φ2 of the ac-
curacy of classifying 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 up to 99.1%. For
the 1st-phase sub-classifier φ1, we use the weight balance
method to balance the dataset for the binary classification. In
Figure 6, the accuracy of φ1 is higher than 95% as ns = 10.
For all the values of ρ, the certified accuracy of the 2-phase
classifier outperforms that of the classifier trained by the tra-
ditional training algorithm.
A comparison with other methods
We only compare our random selection defenses with bag-
ging method (Jia, Cao, and Gong 2020) because it outper-
forms other 2 methods (Rosenfeld et al. 2019; Ma, Zhu, and
Hsu 2019) largely in the experiments of (Jia, Cao, and Gong
2020). The bagging method is the same as scheme 2. For
case 1,2, the δ(ρ) of scheme 2 is larger than scheme 3 that
we propose. Therefore, scheme 3 achieve better certified ac-
curacy in MNIST 17 when ns = 10, nc = 0 as showed in
Figure 4. For case 3, we propose 2-phase classifiers, which
outperforms previous training algorithms.
Figure 6: Left: the certified accuracy of 2-phase classifiers
3 as a function of the size of the sub-datasets ns. Right: the
certified accuracy of classifiers trained by the algorithm 2 as
a function of the size of the sub-datasets ns.
Ablation study
Impact of the random selection scheme When the clas-
sification task is simple, which means classifiers trained on
a small size sub-dataset can already achieve high accuracy,
scheme 3 may be the best choice among 3 random selection
schemes. It is because δ(ρ) of scheme 3 is lower than other
2 schemes when n and ns are small. When the classification
task is difficult, which means only the classifiers trained on
large size sub-datasets can achieve ideal accuracy, 3 schemes
perform nearly the same.
Impact of ns ns is the size of the selection. As ns in-
creases, each sub-dataset contains more training samples.
Therefore, the accuracy of the smooth classifiers increases.
Higher ns also results in higher δ(ρ), so p1 − p2 needs to
be larger for the same ρ. Therefore, ns controls the trade-off
between the clean accuracy and robustness.
Impact of nc nc is the size of the clean part Dc. In all
experiments, the certified accuracy at all ρ improves as nc
increases. For the random selection schemes at small ns, the
degree of the increase in certified accuracy is higher than
that of the high ns.
Conclusion
We propose a general framework of random selection based
certified defenses against data poisoning attacks in this
work. We prove the certified robustness of all the random
selection schemes that satisfy our proposed conditions. The
certified radius derived from our framework is tighter than
previous works. To make our framework more practical, we
consider the leverage of prior knowledge about the train-
ing set and the attacker’s capability. Given prior knowledge
about the training set, our certified radius can be tighter.
Given prior experience of the poisoning model, our train-
ing algorithm can achieve better certified accuracy practi-
cally. Our framework shows the potential of random selec-
tion schemes in defending data poisoning. Our study high-
lights the use of prior knowledge for the improvement of
randomized smoothing. We hope our framework would in-
spire the future work on random selection based defenses.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let Pρ : Dn → D′m as the training model on the dataset Dn. For all D′m ∈ Pρ(Dn), let Ω be Dn∩D′m. If the random selection
scheme µ satisfies
∀D′m ∈ Pρ(Dn) (16)
∃ constant pi1, pi2 (17)
∀Dsub ∈ Ω (18)
pi2Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ≥ Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) ≥ pi1Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) (19)
We refer to gx(Dn) = EDsub∼µ(Dn)fx(Dsub) as the smooth classifier (x is arbitrary). Without loss of generality, we assume
g predicts c1, c2 as the top-2 classes for x. The g’s confidence of c1, c2 is p1, p2.
EDsub∼µ(Dn)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1) = p1 (20)
EDsub∼µ(Dn)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2) = p2 (21)
Our goal is equal to prove ∀D′m ∈ {Pρ(Dn)} , P r(gx(D′m) = c1) ≥ Pr(gx(D′m) = c2)
First we consider the case that the attacker only modify Dn, without insertion or deletion. For the poisoned dataset D′m that
different from Dn at most ρ samples. We denote Sρ as the set of those ρ poisoned samples. Then we have:
Pr(gx(D
′
m) = c1) (22)
=EDsub∼µ(D′m)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1) (23)
=
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) (24)
≥
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) ∗ 0 (25)
=
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) (26)
=
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) (27)
For our assumption about µ, we have:
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub) (28)
≥pi1
[ ∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub)
]
(29)
=pi1
Pr(gx(Dn) = c1)− ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = piDsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub
 (30)
=pi1
p1 − ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c1|Dsub)
 (31)
≥pi1
p1 − ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ∗ 1
 (32)
=pi1
p1 − ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)
 (33)
Same as the above proof, we have:
Pr(gx(D
′
m) = c2) (34)
=
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub) (35)
≤
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) ∗ 1 (36)
=
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (37)
≤pi2
∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub) +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (38)
=pi2
Pr(gx(Dn) = c2)− ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub)
+ ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (39)
=pi2
p2 − ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub)Pr(fx(Dsub) = c2|Dsub)
+ ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (40)
≤pi2
p2 − ∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ∗ 0
+ ∑
Dsub⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (41)
=pi2p2 +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (42)
if
pi1p1 − pi1
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) ≥ pi2p2 +
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (43)
then we have
Pr(gx(D
′
m) = c1) ≥ Pr(gx(D′m) = c2) (44)
For all the inequalities above 25,29,32,36,38,41, the equalities can hold. Therefore, our bound of the certified radius is tight.
The proof of theorem 1 is complete.
Proof of certified radius bound for 3 random selection schemes.
Without loss of generality, we assume Dsub is of ns size. Give m,n, the size of Ω is equal to max(m,n)− ρ. For all 3 random
selection schemes that satisfy pi1 = pi2, the inequality 43 can be expressed as
p1 − p2 ≥
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) +
1
pi1
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) (45)
Bagging without replacement First we prove µ satisfies theorem 1
∀Dsub ∈ {Dsub : Dsub ⊂ Ω} (46)
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) =
(
n
ns
)
(47)
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) =
(
m
ns
)
(48)
pi1 = pi2 =
(
m
ns
)
/
(
n
ns
)
(49)∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = 1−
(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
n
ns
)
(50)
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = 1−
(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
m
ns
)
(51)
The certified radius is max ρ that satisfies
max
n−ρ≤m≤n+ρ
1−
(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
n
ns
)
+
(
n
ns
)
/
(
m
ns
)
−
(
n
ns
)(
max(m,n)− ρ
ns
)
/
(
m
ns
)2
≤ p1 − p2 (52)
Bagging with replacement First we prove µ satisfies theorem 1
∀Dsub ∈ {Dsub : Dsub ⊂ Ω} (53)
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = (
1
n
)ns (54)
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = (
1
m
)ns (55)
pi1 = pi2 = (
n
m
)ns (56)∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = 1− (max(m,n)− ρ
n
)ns (57)
∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = 1− (
max(m,n)− ρ
m
)ns (58)
The certified radius is max ρ that satisfies
max
n−ρ≤m≤n+ρ
1 +
(m
n
)ns − 2(max(m,n)− ρ
n
)ns
≤ p1 − p2 (59)
Binomial selection µp First we prove µp satisfies theorem 1
∀Dsub ∈ {Dsub : Dsub ⊂ Ω} (60)
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = p
ns(1− p)n−ns (61)
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = p
ns(1− p)m−ns (62)
pi1 = pi2 = (1− p)m−n (63)∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(Dn) = Dsub) = 1− (1− p)min(n−m,0)+ρ (64)∑
Dsub 6⊂Ω
Pr(µ(D′m) = Dsub) = 1− (1− p)min(m−n,0)+ρ (65)
The certified radius is max ρ that satisfies
max
n−ρ≤m≤n+ρ
1 + (1− p)n−m − 2(1− p)min(n−m,0)+ρ ≤ p1 − p2 (66)
